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Whenever the need arose and a war broke out … they all joined the 
battle.1 
 
The whole race is war-mad, high-spirited and quick to battle.2 
 
Caesar’s self-serving memoir of his Gallic wars (58-51 B.C.) reveals much 
about the ancient Celtic attitude towards war. Fighting was a key 
component of the life of the Celtic elite, but also pervaded the culture at all 
levels. The legends of other Celtic lands give a similar impression of small 
war bands, great heroes and large set-piece battles – much as Caesar himself 
described them in Gaul. 
 
From about the early fifth century B.C. in central Europe to its high-
point in the third century B.C. the Celts came to dominate much of Europe, 
from Spain to Asia Minor. Their growth and expansion was not 
synonymous with war; trade and industry played a large part in their 
cultural primacy by the 200s B.C. However, war was the key to opposing 
the expansion of others, including Romans and the Germanic tribes. In the 
British Isles, Rome’s influence contained Celtic culture within Scotland, 
Wales and Ireland, and fifth century Christianisation challenged some Celtic 
practices. 
 
War was an all-male activity. Archaeological evidence suggests as 
many as half all adult males were buried with weaponry. Caesar reported 
the high level of ownership of weapons among some groups (did this make 
his victory sound all the more impressive?).3  The typical Celtic warrior 
carried a spear over a metre long as well as short throwing spears and a 
large round shield of wood covered with leather and bearing a metal boss to 
protect the hand that gripped it. No uniform existed with civilian clothes 
                                       
1  “hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum indicit … omnes in bello 
versantur.”: Caesar, De Belli Gallico, 6.15.1. 
2  Strabo, Geographica, 4.4.2. See R. L. Jimenez, Caesar against the Celts 
(New York: Sarpedon, 1995). 
3  Caesar reports the Helvetian census, stating that of 350,000 people 90,000 
bore arms, amounting to about a quarter of the population: Caesar, De 
Belli Gallico, 6.15.1. See B. Cunliffe, The Celtic World: An Illustrated 
History of the Celtic Race (London: Greenwich House, 1992). 
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being worn into battle, usually a cloak over a smock and trousers. Nobles 
differed from common men in two respects: a torc, or neck ring, and a fairly 
long sword. The elite warrior might also be protected by a helmet and body-
armour of leather or metal. 
 
Ancient Celtic warfare was predominantly a pedestrian affair, 
however, in Ireland, charioteers consisted of two-man teams that travelled 
near a warrior to allow him to escape from the battlefield if he were 
seriously wounded. The Irish Ulster Cycle and Roman and Greek historians 
refer to this practice. So too do they mention war bands, including the Irish 
fianna or the Gaesates that each played a part in the Italian Wars fought 
against the Romans.4 Fionn Mac Cumhaill is just one of the charismatic 
leaders of such a band. However, these men were clearly not part of settled 
Celtic society, but rather were ‘professional’ fighters; early Celtic 
mercenaries, or swords-for-hire. The best known battle tactic of the Celt 
was the mass charge; an attempt to overrun the enemy by shear force. This 
tactic was familiar to Caesar in the period of the Gallic wars and would 
again re-appear, many centuries later, in the famous “Highland charge” 
employed by McColla’s forces under the Marquis of Montrose in the British 
Civil Wars of the 1640s.5 
 
Originally, war bands and battle forces were arranged along regional 
or family lines. Equally, the warfare of later ages reflected the proverbial 
‘clannish’ nature of the Celt. But with so much effort put into a massed 
charge, including lots of noise to unsettle the enemy, there was often little 
endurance in the Celtic fight.6 Polybius reported the “noise, impetus and 
colour of the Celtic battle-charge, and the frenzy of the warrior group called 
gaisatai, who fling themselves naked into the fight.”7 Yet at the same time 
he disparaged the weapons of the Celt – swords too cumbersome and 
unwieldy for battle – and their reliability due to old habits of cattle raiding.8 
It is important to remember the great exception to the general rule of Celtic 
                                       
4  G. Dobesch, Die Kelten in Österreich nach den ältesten Berichten der 
Antike (Vienna: Böhlau, 1979); Hildegard Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und 
Niedergang der römischen Welt, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 
2.6.263-5; J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in 
Republican Italy (Oxford: Classical Monographs, 2001), p. 90. 
5  D. Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars 
(Edinburgh, 1980; reprint 2003). 
6  Miranda Aldhouse-Green, The Celtic world (London, 1995), p. 23.  
7  Plybius, Histories, 2.22, 2.27. 
8  Plybius, Histories, 2.7. Care is needed when taking Polybius’ criticisms at 
face value, see H. D. Rankin, Celts and the Classical World (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p. 72. 
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warfare that is posed by the superior generalship and organisational ability 
of the Celtic Gallic leader, Vercingetorix, at the Siege of Alesia in 
September 52 B.C. Caesar did not triumph by patience and the Celts proved 
their staying power, only breaking after dogged Roman resistance to their 
attempts at a coordinated attack. Another Celtic war leader, the queen of the 
Icenii – Boudicca – led a rebellion against Rome in 61 A.D.9 Meanwhile in 
83 A.D. the battle of Mount Graupius in the far north-east of modern 
Scotland witnessed the last recorded use of the Celtic chariot.10 
 
Early Modern Scottish Warfare 
Continuity is the word often used to describe the nature and capacity of 
Scots armies across the mid-sixteenth to early-seventeenth century. Julian 
Goodare is the strongest contemporary advocate of the connectedness of 
early-modern Scots armies with their medieval forerunners. Indeed, the 
mechanics of raising, equipping and training the armies of Mary, Queen of 
Scots’ reign was essentially that used by Robert the Bruce before the 
campaign that culminated almost 250 years beforehand in the battle of 
Bannockburn in 1314.11 However, army organisation and strength alone do 
not convey the full implications of warfare in early-modern Europe 
generally, or Scotland specifically. Diplomatic and religious innovations 
had a direct impact upon where and why Scottish armies fought, and 
(significantly) how army personnel viewed armed struggle in the period. 
While the Scottish Reformation had little impact on how armies were 
raised, Protestantism became a major force in Scottish affairs. The new 
national faith altered traditional allegiances (most notably with France), 
prompted rebellion from Catholic groups within Scotland and influenced 
aspects of foreign policy that had implications from why and where Scots 
fought. 
 
Military innovation occurred in a number of areas, including the use 
of cavalry and gunpowder weapons. For example, an act in 1540 demanded 
that all soldiers be “unhorsit except greit baronis” reflecting, in part, the 
European trend away from heavy cavalry in favour of cheaper and faster-
trained infantry forces. 12  Far from being a trend in the wider so-called 
                                       
9  Tacitus, Annals, 14. See S. Allen, Celtic Warrior, 300 BC - AD 100 
(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001). 
10  William F. Allen, ‘The Battle of Mons Graupius’, Transactions of the 
American Philological Association (1869-1896), Vol. 11 (1880), pp. 83-
91. 
11  Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 133. 
12  10 December 1540: Parliamentary Register, 3 December 1540, Records of 
the Parliament of Scotland, 1540/12/29. 
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‘military revolution’ that swept through Europe in this era, Scots’ horses 
traditionally played little role in Scottish warfare; terrain, poor local 
specimens and the often guerrilla nature of war in Scotland played a role in 
limiting cavalry efficacy north of the border.13 Even abroad, few Scots made 
their name as cavalry commanders, as opposed to the multitude of 
infantrymen. 
 
Gunpowder-weapons – primarily the musket and cannon – represent 
the most strikingly innovative elements of military equipment across 
Europe in the 1500s. Scotland fell far behind other, wealthier and more 
central states, in its adoption and use of firearms. The Scots crown had at its 
disposal a six-tiered system to deal with military threat, whether domestic or 
foreign. First, it drew on friendly magnates for support augmented, 
secondly, by the common army. Third, mercenary troops might be 
employed and, if that faltered, recourse could be made to England, the 
powerful neighbour. Fifth, royal castles were crown strongholds scattered 
strategically and powerfully across the land, including Edinburgh, 
Blackness, Stirling, and Dumbarton. Finally, the crown had a monopoly on 
huge, expensive bronze cannon, established early-on with the acquisition of 
Mons Meg in 1453 and continued in the attempt to exploit a native foundry 
(only abandoned in 1558).14 
 
The Common Army and Wapinshawing 
The common army is the term used to describe the traditional unpaid, fixed-
service period armed band relied upon by Scots monarchs from the period 
of the middle ages. The wapinshawing, or official muster of fighting men 
within specific districts of the kingdom, was used as a means of assessing 
numbers and the responsibility to serve of Scots throughout the period (and, 
incidentally, carried by Scots colonisers into Ulster in the early-1600s).15 
Soldiers fought unpaid, due to their obligations to the crown, though they 
were arranged in units described by Goodare as “autonomous, unpaid forces 
of private lords”.16 
 
                                       
13  For questions about the nature and extent of the military revolution see J. 
Black, ‘Was There a Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe?’, 
History Today 58 (7) (2008), pp. 34-41. 
14  David H. Caldwell, ‘The Royal Scottish Gun-Foundry in the Sixteenth 
Century’, in A. O’Connor and D. V. Clarke (eds), From the Stone Age to 
the ‘Forty-Five (Edinburgh: Donald, 1983). 
15  See, e.g., Muster Roll for Co. Cavan, 1630: Public Record Office of 
Northern Ireland, D/1759/3C/1. 
16  Goodare, State and Society, p. 134. 
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Before the personal reign of James VI in 1578 (though he did not 
gain full control of his government until 1581), little had been attempted to 
alter the unwieldy, traditional nature of domestic Scottish warfare. In a 
speech to parliament, made in 1607 on the occasion of his penultimate visit 
to Scotland post-Union,17 James said: 
 
In respect the kings of Scotland did not so abound in 
treasure and money to take up an armie under pay, as 
the kings of England did; therefore was the Scottish 
army wont to be raysed onely by proclamation, upon 
the penaltie of their breach of allegiance; so as they 
were all forced to come to the warre like snails who 
carry their house about with them; every nobleman and 
gentleman bringing with him their tents, money, 
provision for their house, victuals of all sorts, and all 
other necessaries, the king supplying them of nothing.18 
 
The speech reflects the king’s frustration with the inefficiency and 
factious disposition inherent in this model of army raising – the mass levy, 
encompassing “all maner of man betuix sexti and sextene”.19 James also 
believed reform, as much as consensus, was needed if armies in Scotland 
were ever to achieve an up-to-date capacity in warfare. From roughly the 
late-1540s to the time of Union in 1603, Scotland’s governing powers 
developed an increasing antipathy towards the mass levy. 
 
Change began after the disastrous battle of Pinkie Cleugh (10 
September 1547), in which some 15,000 Scots were killed and 1,500 
captured and the English said to have lost only 500 of their own men.20 
French soldiers had drilled the Scots pike-men before the battle, and it was 
to France that the Scots turned for greater military assistance during the 
                                       
17  His final visit was in 1617, when he attempted to influence parliament to 
allow the introduction of bishops into the kirk structure. In 1618, James’s 
bishops forced his Five Article of Perth through a General Assembly; but 
the rulings were widely resisted: Pauline Croft, King James (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p 166; David H. Willson, King James VI & I 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p 320. 
18  King James I, Political Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 177. 
19  Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes (12 vols, 
Edinburgh, 1814-75) (hereafter APS), vol. 2, p. 45. 
20  For greater detail see Gervase Phillips, The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550: 
A Military History (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999). 
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latter part of the so-called ‘rough wooings’ of the 1540s.21 But this did not 
result in military innovation; rather, by 1560, an absent monarch and a new 
religion prompted Scotland to move away from France towards England, 
resulting in peace at an international level. Within the kingdom, violence 
and the need for bodies of armed men remained the norm due to prevalence 
of blood-feud and noble factionalism. Private feuds had the blessing of the 
state, while the legal machinery of the kingdom relied on violence in order 
to function – for example, “putting to the horn”, that is, placing offenders 
beyond legal protection from violence and theft of their goods, or Letters of 
Fire and Sword,22 were a feature of the Scots legal system. A prominent 
example of the granting of Letters of Fire and Sword exists in those granted 
to Sir Humphrey Colhoun of Luss to suppress Alasdair MacGregor of 
Glenstrae and his clan, leading to the battle of Glen Fruin in 1603.23 
Unusually for this Highland battle, cavalry featured strongly on the Colhoun 
side, but this proved disadvantageous as the horses became stuck in the 
glen’s boggy terrain, allowing the MacGregors to route the invading force. 
This single battle carried a high death toll with as many as 300 Colhouns 
killed. According to their traditions the Clan Gregor lost few men, although 
among the slain was John dhu MacGregor, the chief’s brother.24 
 
Even in the ‘civilised’ Lowlands there was no state armoury and no 
local weapons stores, ensuring the continued reliance of the crown upon 
freeholders and gentlemen as the backbone of Scottish armies: for example, 
in 1596 it was the “haill gentilmen and frie halderis” of the sheriffdome of 
Edinburgh that were called upon to appear and do service. 25  Pikes and 
muskets were little used or needed in private hands, so the vast majority of 
weapons possessed by Scots obliged to form an army were swords, axes, 
spears or pole-axes of various types, and handguns among wealthier men. 
This was not the stuff to make a modern cohesive early-modern army. 
                                       
21  See Marcus Merriman. The Rough Wooings: Mary Queen of Scots, 1542-
1551 (East Lothian: Tuckwell, 2000); Elizabeth Bonner, ‘The French 
Reactions to the Rough Wooings of Mary, Queen of Scots’, Journal of the 
Sydney Society for Scottish History 6 (1998). 
22  Sir Walter Scott, Manners, Customs and History of the Highlanders of 
Scotland; Historical Account of the Clan MacGregor (Glasgow, 1893), pp. 
121-4. 
23  Amelia G. M. MacGregor, History of the Clan Gregor, From Public 
Records and Private Collections; Compiled at the Request of the Clan 
Gregor Society (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1898, 1901), vol. 1, pp. 206, 287. 
24  MacGregor, History of the Clan Gregor, vol. 1, p. 206; Scott, Manners, 
customs and history of the Highlanders, pp. 121-4. 
25  National Archives of Scotland, Treasury accounts, 1596-7, E21/71, ff. 73-
4.  
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Official standards recognised the paucity of ‘modern’ weaponry: in 1596, to 
“pas to the kingis wyris” a man might possess only a jack (reinforced 
leather jacket) and two-handed sword, or alternatively a bow, sword and 
target (small round shield) “according to the hiland [Highland] 
custowme”.26 Goodare estimates the typical Scottish Lowland force of the 
period would include 5 per cent horsemen, 18 per cent well-armed footmen, 
35 per cent lightly or non-armed infantry, and 42 per cent non-combatants 
(including servants, baggage handlers, horse-holders, etc). 27  By contrast 
Highland forces operated mostly on foot. As stated, firearms were little in 
evidence and the Regent Moray’s expedition to the south-west in 1568, 
including 5,000 fighting men and 3,000 non-combatant followers, contained 
only nine firearms among them all!28 Here it is apt to quote Goodare, who 
says: “the Scottish professional army was hopelessly ill-equipped by the 
standards of professional continental armies”, and yet Highland mercenaries 
abroad in such advanced Continental armies enjoyed a high reputation.29 
 
The wapinshawings had a four-fold purpose: militarising Scotsmen; 
establishing crown command over citizens; ensuring they were armed; and 
training. The musters were neither regular nor common events, and, in 
practice, offered very little in the way of training they did observe a strict 
socio-economic hierarchy though some special musters existed from 1573, 
designed to give explicit training in weapons handling, but these could be 
little more than “popular holidays”, according to Goodare.30 A lack of any 
adequate supply of money by the state or modern weapons among Scots 
was the central downfall of the wapinshawings as an adequate means of 
raising an early-modern army. As a precursor to the period covered by this 
chapter, in 1540 a code of procedure for the efficacy and efficiency of the 
wapinshawing was established in Scotland and again revived in 1575 (but 
with no demand for drilling men in their weapons by parish). 31  This 
procedure, in hand with a militia statute of 1558 stating the legal 
requirements of weapons ownership, placed Scotland well ahead of England 
                                       
26  Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, ed. J. H. Burton et al (37 vols, 
Edinburgh, 1877) (hereafter RPC), vol. 14, pp. 376-80. See J. MacLeod, 
Highlanders: a history of the Gaels (London, 1996). 
27  Goodare, State and Society, p. 138.  
28  James Stewart, 1st Earl of Moray (c.1531–1570), Regent of Scotland from 
1567 until his assassination in 1570. 
29  Goodare, State and Society, p. 139.  
30  Goodare, State and Society, pp. 151-152. 
31  APS, vol. 3, pp. 91-2; Robert Lindsay of Pitscottie, History and 
Chronicles of Scotland, ed. A. J. G. Mackay (3 vols, Scottish Text Society, 
1899-1911), vol. 2, p. 321.  
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in terms of the theory of raising men to fight. 32  In practice, however, 
England always enjoyed a practical superiority over Scotland in these 
matters.33 Between 1595 and 1600 wapinshawings were at their peak, whilst 
other, smaller and directly crown-controlled experiments with armed forces 
were being abandoned as an alternative form of military organisation. 
Ironically, the Highlanders were natural warriors whose primitive arsenal of 
weapons and basic fighting style liberated them from the concerns of 
Lowland war administration. 
 
Mercenaries – paid, full-time soldiers, defined as ‘professionals’ 
because they took money for their service – were the mainstay of 
continental armies from the late-1500s through to the end of the seventeenth 
century. Scotland needed to rely on its feudal, amateur army as there was no 
chance of establishing a permanent military force, centrally paid and 
constantly needed by the crown – neither money nor opportunity existed for 
this. Consequently there was no hope of a professional military career for 
Scots in their native land. When a few military careerists appeared home in 
Scotland after time spent abroad, they were viewed with suspicion. The 
crown well recognised the potential of trained professional warriors for 
supporting intermittently unpopular regimes in Scotland, but other groups in 
society feared their apparent separation from factional loyalty and kinship 
groups, while all were suspicious of the perceived susceptibility to bribery 
and violent conduct of wage-earning soldiers. Captain James Stewart (later 
Earl of Arran from 1581 to 1585), and his “waged men”, and Colonel 
William Stewart were the most prominent of this new breed in the 1570s 
and 1580s.34 
 
Wage-earning soldiers were responsible for the sack of Hamilton in 
1570 “without commiseratioun or pitie”, during the civil war that followed 
Mary, Queen of Scots’ flight into England.35 After this event mercenary 
troops numbered but a few dozen men at most, deployed periodically in the 
                                       
32  Goodare, State and Society, p. 156.  
33  C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s Army (Oxford, 1966), p. 23; L. Boynton, 
The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638 (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 
1967), p. 127. 
34  J. Ferguson (ed.), Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in 
the Service of the United Netherlands, 1572-1782, 3 vols (Edinburgh: 
Scottish History Society, 1899-1901), pp. 8, 20, 96, 115-117, 456. 
35  David Calderwood, History of the Kirk of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and 
D. Laing (8 vols, Wodrow Society, 1843-9), vol. 3, p. 487. Diurnal of 
remarkable occurents that have passed within the kingdom of Scotland 
since the death of Knig James the Fourth, till the year 1575, ed. T. 
Thomson (Bannatyne Club, 1833), p. 192; p. 171. 
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Borders in the later 1570s; but by the 1590s the Earls of Huntly and 
Bothwell did attempt to raise foreign funds – the former from Spain and the 
latter from England – to challenge the crown: both lost in the end.36 Colonel 
Stewart stands almost alone as an early example of a Scottish military 
entrepreneur. One of the few other examples is that of James Colville of 
Easter Wemyss, who commanded a regiment of Scots numbering 1,500 in 
1589 when he fought under English pay on behalf of Henri IV of France in 
his struggle against the Catholic League during the French Wars of 
Religion.37 
 
Thirty Years’ War 
Scots were among the most prominent participants in the conflict of 1618-
48 and Scottish recruits for Swedish service, for instance, were remarkably 
high from the late 1620s and continued throughout the 1630s.38 Few of the 
ordinary rank-and-file of these men ever saw Scotland again, and only a 
handful of their officers ever returned home (assuming they were not among 
the appallingly high casualty rates recorded by these units). 39  One 
explanation for the widespread service rendered by Scots of both religious 
persuasions (for many Catholic Scots also served abroad) might be found in 
the conclusion arrived at by Christopher Duffy that principles of military 
and noble honour often bore little relation to Christian morality. The thirst 
                                       
36  Keith M. Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573-1625: Violence, Justice and 
Politics in an Earl Modern Society (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 
1986), p. 251; James Melville, Autobiography and Diary, ed. R. Pitcairn 
(Wodrow Society, 1842), p. 315. 
37  Sir James Colville of Easter Wemyss, 1st Lord Culross (b.1551–d.1629). 
David Moysie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, 1577-1603, ed. J. 
Dennistoun (Maitland Club, 1830), pp. 73, 78; F. Michel, Les Ecossais en 
France, les Français en Ecosse (2 vols, London, 1862), vol. 2, pp. 122-3 
38  S. L. Adams, ‘The Protestant Cause’ and ‘Foreign Policy and the 
Parliaments of 1621 and 1624’, both in K. Sharp (ed.), Faction and 
Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978); T. Cogswell, ‘Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La 
Rochelle, 1625-6’, English Historical Review, vol. 99 (1984), pp. 241-67; 
J. Reeve, ‘Quiroga’s Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish 
Diplomacy During the Thirty Years’ War’, English Historical Review 100 
(1986), pp. 913-26; E. Weiss, Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der 
pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I. von England im dreissigjährigen Krieg 
(1618-1632). Stuttgart: PhD Dissertation, 1966 (Stuttgart: Publications of 
the Commission for Regional History in Baden-Württemberg Series B No. 
37, 1967). 
39  Matthew Glozier, Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: 
Nursery for Men of Honour. History of Warfare Series: 24 (Leiden, 
Boston, Köln: E. J. Brill, 2004), p. 24. 
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of many Scots for honour on the battlefield, and the contemporary early-
modern aversion to bringing disgrace upon one’s family’s name, supports 
Duffy’s view that religion might have played a subsidiary role in the career 
decisions of many professional Scottish soldiers.40 
 
Contemporary Scottish officials believed that something in the order 
of one in twenty adult Scottish males were required for military service 
abroad. 41  Geoffrey Parker has produced a map, showing the recruiting 
grounds of Europe’s armies between 1550 and 1650, which demonstrates 
that, overall, most Scottish soldiers came from a swathe of land across 
central Scotland, encompassing both Lowland and Highland areas.42 One of 
the most important requirements for the continuity of Scottish military 
involvement in the Thirty Years’ War was a readily available pool of able-
bodied men. 
 
At a fundamental level, any Scot who decided upon a career in the 
army, needed to possess the quality of raw courage as he was entering into a 
way of life which might demand of him both life and limb. Similarly, young 
gentlemen were expected to have the commanding presence that breeding 
alone could produce, whether on the parade ground or the battlefield.43 
 
Diaspora: Case Study of Russia 
A number of native born ‘Celtic’ Scots entered Russian service, many from 
the Swedish army. 44  In the late 1500s many soldiers escaped Swedish 
service and ventured to Moscow to serve the Tsar; among them Gabriell 
Elphingsten, a “valiant Scottish captain”, who arrived with a commendation 
from a fellow Scot, Colonel Stewart (who served the King of Denmark). Six 
                                       
40  Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason 
(London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1987), p. 74. 
41  RPC, vol. 1, p. 88. 
42  Geoffrey Parker and Angela Parker, European Soldiers, 1550-1650 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 24-25. 
43  “The posture, gait, voice, and the movement of the body and hands must ... 
all convey an impression of grace, avoiding that which is coarse and 
boorish, and equally that which is over-sweet and effeminate”: Wolff, 
Versuch über die Sittlichen Eigenschaften und Pflichten des 
Soldatenstandes, p. 404, cited in Duffy, Age of Reason, p. 84. 
44  Sir J. Horsey, Extracts out of Sir J. H.’s Observations in seventeene yeeres 
travels and experience in Russia, and other countries adjoyning (S. 
Purchas the Elder, 1626) republished in Russia at the close of the sixteenth 
century. Comprising the treatise “Of the Russe Commonwealth,” by G. F., 
and the travels of Sir J. Horsey, now for the first time printed entire from 
his own manuscript, ed. E. A. Bond (London, 1856), p. 225. 
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other Scots came with him “but all verie bare of monny and furniture [n.b. 
possessions]”.45 Elphingstone took charge of a large number of Swedish 
deserters, of whom the Scots were the most favoured. He was soon followed 
into Russian service by General Carmichael, uncle to Sir John Carmichael, 
Warden of the Border in Scotland, from the family settled at Hyndford in 
Lowland Scotland. In 1570 Carmichael was given command of 5,000 of the 
Tsar’s men during the Great Northern War, and later became Governor of 
Pskoff. Giles Fletcher, writing in 1591, says “of mercenarie soldiers that are 
strangers (whom they call nemschoy), they have at this time 4,300 of 
Polonians: of Chircasses (that are under the Polonians) about four thousand, 
whereof 3,500 are abroad in his garrisons, of Deutches [Germans] and Scots 
about 150, of Greekes, Turks, Danes, and Swedes, all in one band an 100 or 
thereabouts. But these they use only upon the Tartar side and against the 
Siberians”.46 
 
The Scottish settlers, excluded like all non-Orthodox residents from 
the kitai gorod (China City) and the byelo gorod (White City) of Moscow, 
were placed in the nemetskaya sloboda, beyond the gates of the capital, 
north–west of the city. 47  Most Scots married their fellow exiles, mainly 
Livonians and Germans. One, a Hamilton, was almost certainly among the 
Swedish prisoners, mentioned previously and left two sisters as 
descendants, who both married Russians: one wed Artamon Sergievitch 
Matveeff and the other Feodor Poleukhtovitch Narishkin, both members of 
prominent Russian noble families.48 
 
The career of just one of these Scots is worth citing as it says much 
about their role in Russian history. When Tsar Feodor was overthrown by 
his wife’s brother, Boris Feodorovitch Godounoff, Captain David Gilbert, a 
Scot, cooperated with the Frenchman, Captain Margaret, and other 
international scoundrels, to support Godounoff. On his death, Gilbert served 
in the bodyguard of the so–called ‘False’ Dmitri, composed entirely of 
foreigners. The bodyguard consisted of 300 English, French and Scots, 
divided into three squadrons, and commanded by officers of each nation.49 
                                       
45  G. Fletcher, Of the Russe Commonwealth, ed. R. Pipes and J. V. A. Fine 
(London, 1856; republished Harvard: Harvard University Press, Mass., 
1966), pp. 52, 73. 
46  Fletcher, Of the Russe, pp. 52, 73. 
47  K. Waliszewski, Peter the Great (London: W. Heinemann, 1897), p. 15. 
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Gilbert was one of the 52 strangers whom the second False Dmitri wished 
to drown in the river Oka. Gilbert subsequently served in the ranks of the 
Polish army, but was soon taken prisoner and brought to Moscow. The 
MSS. of the Orusheinaya Palace at Moscow show that Gilbert, Captain 
Jacob Margaret, Robert Dunbar (another Scot), and Andrew Let were taken 
into the military service of another Russian magnate, Afanassi Ivanovitch 
Vlasseff in 1600-1601.50 
 
In 1610 the Scotsman, Captain Robert Carr, accompanied Gilbert 
and his son, Thomas, on their return to Russia. Carr commanded one of the 
six companies of British cavalry which on 24 June 1610, remained for the 
longest time on the battlefield in the defeat of the new Tsar Vassili Shuiski's 
army by the Poles at Kluchino under the Grand Hetman Zolkiewski. Carr 
lost his whole company, but remained unwounded. The names of the other 
captains were Benson, Crale, Crichton, Kendrick and York. Disillusioned, 
Thomas Gilbert and Captain Carr returned home in 1619, but the elder 
Gilbert remained in Russia and probably died there.51 
 
In 1631, at the height of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) – when the 
first Romanov ruled in Russia – another Scot, Sir Alexander Leslie of 
Auchintoul, arrived with a letter from King Charles I to the Tsar Michael.52 
The Patriarch Philarete, then co–regent, sent him to Sweden to hire 5,000 
infantry, and persuade smiths and wheelwrights, carpenters, and other vital 
tradesmen, to settle in Russia as part of his regimental community. By the 
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end of 1631 there were 66,000 mercenaries in Moscow.53 Captain William 
Gordon, another Scot, was at the same time in the Muscovite service. In 
1634, a Lieutenant–Colonel Alexander Gordon was also present; he appears 
in Sir Thomas Urquhart’s Jewel among the “Scottish colonels that served 
under the great Duke of Muscovy, against the Tartar and Polonian”.54 
 
In the reign of the next Tsar, Aleksei Michaelovitch (1645–76), there 
was a marked increase in the number of Scots in Russia. The Tsar raised the 
number of foreign soldiers in his dominion, including two regiments, “one 
of cavalry and one of infantry … commanded by a Scotsman as colonel, and 
have a staff’s company in each of them. He received four times the usual 
pay”. 55  This Scot was probably no other than Sir Alexander Leslie of 
Auchintoul. On 28 March 1633, Captain James Forbes received a 
commission to raise in Scotland 200 men for the Russian service under 
Auchintoul, and on 1 May 1633, was granted a warrant to levy the same 
number of men Auchintou as “Generall Colonel of the Forrain forces of the 
Emperour of Russia” was granted.56  Five years later, in 1638, the first 
Bishop’s War broke out between England and Scotland (precipitating the 
Civil Wars of the 1640s). Though many Scots returned from Sweden to 
defend their homeland, those in Russia were too far flung to heed the call 
home.57 
 
Following the disastrous conflict in Britain, a number of royalist 
Scots entered Russian service – if for no other reason than desperation at 
making a living in exile. In 1656 Thomas Dalyell of Binns (who never 
shaved his beard after the 1649 execution of his beloved master, King 
Charles I) and William Drummond of Cromlix entered the Russian service 
together. Binns became a general, and Cromlix a lieutenant–general and 
Governor of Smolensk. Both returned to Scotland in 1665, but only on the 
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direct entreaty of King Charles II to the Tsar who was loath to allow any of 
his servants to depart his service. The autocratic rule born over their men by 
Cromlix and Binns was much commented on.58 Dalyell was described as a 
man whose “rude and fierce natural disposition had been much confirmed 
by his breeding and service in Muscovy, where he had the command of a 
small army and saw nothing but tyranny and slavery”. 59  Later in the 
century, Gilbert Burnet wrote of Drummond of Cromlix that he “had yet too 
much of the air of Russia about him, though not with Dalziel’s fierceness”. 
Dalyell of Binns was also denounced as “a Muscovy beast who used to 
roast men”, and accused of having introduced the thumbscrews as a torture 
device into Scotland; though in truth it was already known, called by 
another name “the pilliewincks”.60 To confirm all of these prejudiced, the 
Catholic James II created Drummond of Cromlix Viscount Strathallan 
(1686), and Dalyell was Commander–in–Chief of the Scottish army till his 
death at Edinburgh in August 1685. 
 
Cromlix and Binns were, however, unusual in that they came home. 
Most Scots in Russia would not, or could not, leave. Paul Menzies, a son of 
Sir Gilbert Menzies of Pitfoddels, came to Russia from the Polish service in 
1661. The Tsar Aleksei showed him immediate favour and arranged his 
marriage to a Russian woman, and he was appointed a gentleman in the 
household of the Boyar Feodor Michaelovitch Milotawski, envoy to Persia. 
In 1672 Menzies acted as the Tsar’s envoy to Prussia and to Vienna to 
propose a league against the Turk and proceeded to Rome to petition Pope 
Clement X to assist Poland against the Ottoman Sultan, and succeeded in 
his mission. He returned in 1674, to become tutor to Peter the Great (which 
he remained until 1682). In 1689 he gained the rank of lieutenant–general; 
he died on 9 November 1694, leaving a wife and children. Incidentally, as a 
devout Catholic and a good Scot, when in Rome he obtained from Pope 
Clement X permission for a service to be held commemorating Saint 
Margaret, Queen of Scots. Several members of the Catholic family of 
Menzies travelled to Russia to capitalize on the Tsar’s good will; 
Lieutenant–Colonel Thomas Menzies of Balgownie was one. He married at 
Riga in July 1651, a noble lady from Curland, and was wounded and taken 
prisoner by his countryman, Lord Henry Gordon, youngest son of George, 
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second Marquis of Huntly. The young Gordon was fighting for the Poles 
and also happened to capture his distant cousin, Gordon of Auchleuchries at 
the battle of Szudna in 1660. Balgownie later died of wounds in the 
Ukraine. By contrast, Lord Henry Gordon died at home in Strathbogie; he 
was described as being a “little hair–brained, but very courageous” – a 
fitting description for many of the Scots who served so far from home.61 
 
Concluding Remarks: MacColla and the Highland Charge 
In the era of Early Modern Europe (circa 1450-1750 A.D.) clan chiefs could 
often achieve victory when on the offensive, but only when they led from 
the front by exerting personal control over their kin and followers. This 
worked best as guerrilla-style warfare against poor or under-motivated 
opponents, especially where generals attempted to establish isolated 
garrison posts within Gaelic territory. The dreaded ‘Highland charge’ of 
Montrose’s Celtic supporters during the Civil War battles of the 1640s 
carried the field at a number of notable battles. After generations of 
obscurity in their Highland fastnesses, the Celtic style of war seemed 
suddenly to burst forth and carry all before it. Forty years later this was 
proved most famously under Alasdair MacColla’s command at the stunning 
Jacobite victory at Killicrankie (27 July 1689) which demonstrated the 
ongoing primacy of the charge. 62  However, increasingly well-trained 
government forces frustrated the tactic and dispersed Jacobites at turning-
points such as Culloden (16 April 1746) during ‘Bonnie’ Prince Charlie’s 
Jacobite uprising. Indeed, the dreaded Highland charge presaged the mode 
of all the Jacobite uprisings – initially very successful, but soon frustrated 
through command squabbles or inflexibility of response to the enemy. 
 
Duncan Stevenson says that by the mid-eighteenth century the 
English, with better equipment (notably the quick-firing musket and ring 
bayonet) and subject to strict parade-ground discipline in the 18th century 
manner took the advantage out of the Highland charge, dissipating its power 
and psychological strength.63 This was especially effective when the Scots 
could be lured into unfamiliar, enemy territory which stretched their supply 
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lines and taxed their knowledge of terrain. The Celts were lightly equipped 
and could (to a fairly good degree) ignore logistical demands that would 
stall more conventional forces. It has even been suggested they left this 
legacy to the Confederate forces of the American Southern states in 1861, 
allowing many genuine Scots descendants among those forces to experience 
something of the style of their ancestors’ Celtic warfare. It is even 
suggested (though it is perhaps far-fetched) that the famous Confederate 
‘Rebel yell’ originated in the screams the Highlanders traditionally made 
during the charge!64 
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